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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
-vs-
DENNIS LOVELESS, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 15,511 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The mischief in the State's initial statement of facts 
is that it attempts to divert the attention of the Court 
from the issue on appeal to the moral character and nature 
of the crime involved. Further, the government's recital of 
the facts surrounding the submission of the verdict form to 
the jury is again totally irrelevant to the basis of this 
appeal. The appellant's contention is simply that where 
there are two statutes which proscribe the same conduct but 
impose different penalties, the violator is entitled to be 
punished in accordance with the lesser penalty. 
APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE ANY CLAIM OF ERROR BY FAILING 
TO OBJECT PRIOR TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT. 
First, the fact that the two statutes circumscribed the 
same kind of conduct was brought to the Court's attention in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
earlier proceedings. This is reflected by Mr. Howard's 
comments at the time the sentence was pronounced (T. 9, 
lines 8 and 9). 
Second, it is the appellant's position that there is no 
duty on the part of a defendant to object to a pronouncement 
of judgment before it is made by the Court. Such a pro-
cedural gesture on the part of a defendant would be presump-
tive, untimely and rude. The government's argument, by it's 
nature, requires and assumes that the defendant or his 
counsel be clairvoyant. 
Accordingly, Utah Code Annotated, 77-37-1 (1975), 
establishes the presumption that the verdict and judgment 
are deemed excepted to and no other action outside the 
perfection of the appeal is required to preserve the issue 
on appeal. The statute states: 
The verdict of the jury, and all 
orders, decisions and rulings made by 
the district court, or judge thereof, 
including rulings on objections to, or 
motions to strike out, evidence, from 
the inception of the cause shall be 
deemed excepted to. Exceptions to in-
structions to the jury shall be taken 
and preserved as in civil cases. U.C.A. 
§77-37-1 (1975). 
The appellant actually went beyond the requirements of the 
statute and actively objected to the sentence pronounced by 
the Judge (T. 9, lines 9-12). 
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The State cites State v. Thacker, 98 Idaho 369, 564 
P.2d 1278 (1977), for the proposition that error relating to 
the sentencing process must be timely raised. That case 
does not deal with an objection to sentencing, but instead, 
deals with a defendant's contention on appeal that a pre-
sentence report, which he had previously read and approved, 
was inadequate. The Court held that since the defendant's 
attorney had stated that he had gone over the report and was 
satisfied with it, the defendant could not argue on appeal 
that it was inadequate. The government cites no authority 
to support the supposition that a timely objection to 
judgment must precede the judgment itself. The law is 
clearly contra. See State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 396 P.2d 
5 (1964); State v. Cassius, 21 Ariz. App. 78, 515 P.2d 903 
(1973) and State v. Vickery, 85 N.M. 389, 512 P.2d 962 
(1973). Vickery, supra, holds that where there are two 
statutes providing different penalties for identical acts, 
there is a constitutional question as to whether the one 
providing the higher penalty offends the requirement of 
equal protection and such a question can be raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
THE TWO STATUTES PROSCRIBE THE SAME CONDUCT AND THE 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
LESSOR PENALTY 
The State's argument is concessional and impliedly 
Jdmitc that if the statutes proscribe the same conduct, the 
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L 
defendant is entitled to be punished in accordance with the 
lessor penalty. The government maintains that: 
The two statutes would proscribe 
the same conduct if, and only if, the 
victim's age is used to establish both 
lack of consent and the aggravating 
circumstance. (Respondent's Brief P.6) 
Even if the above point is conceded to the government, 
the evidence shows that lack of consent and the aggravating 
circumstance were established by the victim's age. The 
information upon which the defendant was convicted accused 
him of the following specific conduct: 
On or about the 6th day of February, 1977, 
at Farmington, County of Davis, State of 
Utah, the above defendant did have sexual 
intercourse with a female, not his wife, 
to wit" Brenda Winnett, under the age of 
14. (R.l). 
The indictment does not allege any aggravating circumstance 
other than the age of the victim. The age of the victim was 
necessarily used to establish both lack of consent and 
aggravating circumstances, otherwise there would not have 
been a prima facie case of Aggravated Sexual Assault. 
The government cannot now claim that it could have 
proved other aggravating circumstances that are totally 
outside the pleadings used to indict the defendant. The 
appellant has proven that the specific conduct complained of 
the defendant is proscribed by two statutes, State v. Chavez, 
77 ll.r1. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966), and thus he is entitled to 
the lessor punishment. Ramrnell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 
(Utah 1977). 
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CONCLUSION 
The brief of the government has done nothing to change 
the obvious fact that the specific conduct alleged in the 
indictment which the appellant was convicted of was taken 
from the rape statute and the only way that language could 
be converted into a prima facie case of Aggravated Sexual 
Assault would be for the alleged "age" element to be used 
both to establish lack of consent and an aggravating cir-
cumstance. The defendant's conduct is thus proscribed by 
both statutes and the State apparently agrees that under 
those circumstances, the appellant has a right to the 
lesser punishment. 
Finally, there is no basis in the law to challenge the 
manner in which the appellant has preserved this issue for 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this (,~ day of May, 1978. 
~SON HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Steven C. Vanderlinden, Deputy County Attorney, Davis County 
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, 84025, this :Jt./'lfiday of May, 1978. 
-24~~-
Secretary 
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